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In the context of healthcare, making choices can be
seen, states Mol (2008: x), as ‘the very act that turns a
person into a subject’. Having choice about what in-
terventions to use, what technologies to allow into
their life and the kind of care they need can turn peo-
ple into actors – active agents who have the power to
make some changes to move a litle bit closer towards
the construction of a good, or beter, life. People are
increasingly being given the responsibility to make
choices that are seen as healthy (Henwood et al. 2011),
although it is not always clear which choices can be
described as healthy and which not (see for example
Department of Health 2010, for a repeated use of the
word healthy without deﬁning it).
Mol (2008) has oﬀered a comprehensive critique of
what she refers to as the ‘logic of choice’ as a guiding
framework in healthcare. She argues that this logic
has led to the construction of people as consumers of
services, with not only the right, but also the respon-
sibility to choose the services they need. In the logic
of choice people are turned into what Mol called pa-
tient-consumers and the emphasis shifts ‘to the rights
of individuals within increasingly marketised serv-
ices’ (2011: 509). People are expected to make the
choices that are right for them and assume responsi-
bility for the outcomes of their choices. Mol (2008)
discusses a logic of care as a necessary complement
to a logic of choice. In care, Mol argues, solutions to
disease can be found only by acknowledging the in-
tersubjectivity of life.
In this article, I want to add to the ongoing discus-
sion about the logic of choice by exploring a diﬀerent
dimension of it. I am interested in what happens when
people are denied the interventions they choose. The
speciﬁc interventions I focus on in this article are
home modiﬁcations. Drawing on a phenomenological
(Jackson 1998, 2006; Mol 2006) and on a narrative
(Matingly 2010, 2008) approach to foreground what
maters to speciﬁc people, my aim in this article is to
show how people living with a chronic illness or dis-
ability interact with the logic of choice when they are
denied choice; what eﬀects does it bring in their lives,
and how do they evaluate these eﬀects? To do this, I
focus on how one woman, Arleen, living with motor
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neurone disease (MND), tried to construct a good life
in her local context. In order to do this, Arleen mo-
bilised certain practices to create a present where life
was worth living and imagined a future where this
would continue to be so.
Using empirical evidence from a narrative-based
study on living with MND, in this article I tease out
some of the links between subjectivity and the logic of
choice, focusing in particular on the experiential
knowledge that guides decision-making. By present-
ing Arleen’s eﬀorts to create a life she was satisﬁed
with and that she felt was worth living, I also con-
tribute to a broader discussion about the construction
of subjectivity. In this article, I illustrate not only how
people living with a chronic illness enact subjectivity
by moving between ‘what is given and what is cho-
sen’, to borrow Jackson’s (1998: 21) phrase, but also by
moving between what can be chosen and what cannot
be chosen.
Background
The Logic of Choice in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the emergence of the logic of
choice is particularly evident in the ways people are
expected to take responsibility for managing long-
term or chronic illness and disability (Heaton 1999).
This often happens through the development of rela-
tionships of care, the use of adaptive equipment and
the modiﬁcation of the living environment. Successive
governments in the U.K. have placed emphasis on the
later, viewed home modiﬁcations as providing an ‘in-
dividualised solution to the problems of people expe-
riencing disabling environments’ (Department of
Communities and Local Government 2006: 6). De-
pending on the outcome of a needs assessment by an
occupational therapist, people living with a chronic
illness or disability can be given a ﬁxed amount of
money to modify their living environment to ﬁt their
needs. Choice is a guiding principle in this process,
and is mentioned several times in relevant policies. In
2006, the Department of Health in the U.K. set out its
vision for a ‘strategic shift aimed at supporting choice
and giving people more say over decisions that aﬀect
their daily lives’ (Department of Health 2006: 17). Four
years, and two governments later, the same govern-
ment department stated in its public health strategy
document, that:
all capable adults are responsible for these very per-
sonal choices. At the same time, we do not have total
control over our lives or the circumstances in which
we live. A wide range of factors constrain and inﬂu-
ence what we do, both positively and negatively. (De-
partment of Health 2010: 29)
It is interesting to note that people are still held re-
sponsible for their choices, although it is recognised
that they do not always have control over these
choices.
Motor Neurone Disease
MND is an adult onset, incurable, progressive, neu-
rodegenerative condition that is characterised by the
wasting of voluntary muscles secondary to the de-
struction of motor neurons, leading gradually to par-
tial or complete paralysis (Eisen 2009). As the disease
progresses, functions such as walking, eating, talking
and breathing can be aﬀected, and people with MND
often require help with activities such as eating, toi-
leting or dressing. The average survival expectancy
after diagnosis is three to ﬁve years, which can how-
ever be considerably longer, depending on the type
of MND.
In the absence of a cure and with no hope for re-
covery, studies exploring the experience of living with
MND often emphasise loss and suﬀering, presenting
narratives of tragedy. In these stories, the central char-
acters cannot live a good life, ever after. A good life
however can refer to ‘possible worlds and possible
selves worth striving for’ (Matingly 2008: 95). Living
with MND is after all an everyday reality for many
people. The main issue then becomes, how can one
live with MND combining a life lived with an incur-
able disease that leads to paralysis and reduced life
expectancy, and a life that one can still deﬁne as good
and that is worth living? In this article I discuss some
of the choices that people can take in their eﬀorts to-
wards the construction of a good life.
Methodology
This article is based on a narrative-based study that
was conducted in Wales, U.K., between 2011 and
2013. My aim was to explore how people make sense
of living with MND. I developed a methodology that
facilitated in-depth meaning-sharing by the partici-
pants (see also Sakellariou et al. 2013). Data collection
took place through observations, e-mail and multiple,
joint, in-depth interviews. Seven people in total par-
ticipated in the study, which resulted in the produc-
tion of unique narratives for each participant. This
article reports on the ﬁndings from one of the partic-
ipants. Although all participants were trying, in their
own ways, to construct a good life, a life they were
satisﬁed with and which they thought was worth liv-
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ing, Arleen interacted very closely with the logic of
choice throughout the eighteen months of her in-
volvement in the study. I chose to use two speciﬁc
scenes from Arleen’s story to illustrate my argument
about the logic of choice.
The study was approved by the research ethics
commitee of the School of Healthcare Sciences,
Cardiﬀ University. Some personal details of the par-
ticipants and all names have been changed to protect
the anonymity of the participants.
Arleen: Learning What Can Be Chosen
and What Cannot Be Chosen 
Arleen was in her early ﬁfties when I met her in 2011
and had been diagnosed with a slow-moving sub-
type of MND for a few years. She had developed
dysarthria, and therefore she spoke slowly. At Ar-
leen’s request our initial interactions took place via e-
mail and when we ﬁrst met in person I remember
being nervous, worrying I might not be able to under-
stand her, leading to a potentially awkward situation,
especially since it was me who had suggested that
meeting in person might facilitate data collection.
However, Arleen’s speech was entirely intelligible and
over the course of her involvement in the study, I can-
not recall a time when I could not understand what
she was saying. In the sections below I present two
scenes from Arleen’s narrative, focusing on how she
interacted with the logic of choice.
Scene 1: The Handrails: A Choice Denied
Arleen lived in a spacious ﬂat, in a relatively central
location, close to shops and a big park. Her front door,
which was only used by her, was on the ground ﬂoor,
but the living space was one ﬂight of stairs up on the
ﬁrst ﬂoor. When I ﬁrst met Arleen she had just re-
ceived a power wheelchair and she was looking for-
ward to going shopping again by herself. However,
as she did not have any space in the entrance of her
ﬂat to store the wheelchair and it was not possible to
move it up and down the stairs to the main living
space, she kept it in the garage. The garage was ac-
cessed through an uneven pathway that could be
quite slippery when wet and especially when there
were leaves on the path. Recognising this as a prob-
lem, she wanted to have handrails installed for part of
the pathway, but this was not as straightforward as
she had hoped, as she described in an e-mail message:
My garage is at the front of my property & the garage
occupies the ground ﬂoor, the front door is at the back
& accessed via a pathway on a gradual incline consist-
ing of a number of steps some metres apart. Even
though it is a public footpath it only houses 12 prop-
erties & where the steps are situated is a blind spot
not overlooked by any properties or the car park/road.
On dark mornings […] I began to lose my conﬁdence
on the steps. I applied to the Council for a hand rail
to be installed, I was told that the waiting list for the
‘District’ Physiotherapist would be anything from 3
to 6 months, & with my disease it properly would not
be worth it. I was told that it would have been futile
for me to go on the waiting list for a district Physio-
therapist assessment for outside hand-rails as the
waiting list was too long for someone with my ‘con-
dition’ […] This [is] one of many ‘like’ examples.
According to the Welsh government, all people are en-
titled to a grant for modiﬁcations that are deemed to
be ‘necessary and appropriate for the needs of the dis-
abled person, and reasonable and practicable in rela-
tion to the property’ (Welsh Local Government
Association 2009: 32). However, Arleen was not able
to choose the modiﬁcations she wanted; not because
the requested modiﬁcations did not meet the neces-
sary criteria, but because Arleen herself was not a
good candidate for such a modiﬁcation, due to the
perceived quick progression of MND.
In Arleen’s story, someone with her condition is
recognised as someone who has a few months to live
and services cannot help her. Arleen was sad and
frustrated for being misrecognised not as Arleen but
as someone with MND, having her individuality and
personal needs ignored in favour of a group identity.
This led to an important decision concerning her
everyday life, the installation of handrails, being
taken mainly on the basis of a pathological entity
without regard to the speciﬁcities of the context and
the person.
Arleen tried to fulﬁl her responsibilities as a patient-
consumer by making a choice that could contribute to
the construction of a good, or beter, life. Handrails
would enable her to get to her car and to her wheel-
chair independently, and she could then go into town
to meet friends, or to the nearby park. However, she
was confronted with the fact that people do ‘not have
total control over our lives or the circumstances in
which we live’ (Department of Health 2010: 29).
During our ﬁrst couple of interviews, Arleen would
state how lucky she felt for knowing how the health
and social care systems work. Gradually, through
sharing stories about her interactions with these sys-
tems she came to a diﬀerent conclusion, as illustrated
through the following e-mail excerpt:
I realise that the system is under a considerable ﬁnan-
cial strain, but my frustration & concern is that even
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Social & Health Professionals only see MND as a dis-
ease with a rapid progression & a short lifespan.
According to Fraser (2000: 113):
What requires recognition is not group-speciﬁc iden-
tity but the status of individual group members as full
partners in social interaction. Misrecognition, accord-
ingly, does not mean the depreciation and deforma-
tion of group identity, but social subordination – in
the sense of being prevented from participating as a
peer in social life.
Being constructed as just another case of MND, Arleen
was given a group identity that had litle to do with
either her needs or with how she viewed herself.
Rather than an abstract sense of exclusion, Arleen felt
she was denied choices and consequently her chance
to participate on a very practical level, by being told
it is futile to apply for modiﬁcations, although it was
of course her right to proceed with the application and
she was aware of this. She had to follow a logic of
choice, but she could not choose what she wanted.
Rather than feeling that she was helped, she felt like
she was treated as another representative case of
MND. But who is to blame for this situation? The pro-
fessional who advised Arleen against having the
handrails installed might have in fact be trying to be
helpful by giving her a realistic estimate of how long
the modiﬁcations would take to be carried out (advice
which is sometimes needed, as illustrated in Sakellar-
iou in press). His or her intention might have been to
help Arleen make an informed decision as to whether
she wanted to wait for six months for an assessment,
given the average life expectancy of a person with
MND. Furthermore, professionals themselves are re-
stricted by the logic of choice in what they can allow
patients-consumers to choose and what not.
Scene 2: The Flat Entrance: Buying Solutions
With no accessible route to her garage, Arleen was dis-
abled. She was disabled by an interaction between a
body aﬀected by MND, a physical terrain and a serv-
ice that was too slow to respond to her needs. A
change in any of these elements could eliminate the
disability that Arleen experienced; while changing the
body was not an option, changing the physical terrain,
either through a publicly funded service or private-
ly, would enable her to access the garage again. So,
 Arleen took action:
I was then transferred back to the Council switch-
board, who asked which department I wanted,
where I explained my predicament again, & was
given the number of a company which specialized in
erecting rails for people with mobility problems, the
work was completed with the costs paid for by me.
(E-mail excerpt)
If in the logic of choice, people are transformed into
consumers, then this means that they can buy inter-
ventions. This possibility for action through buying
comes with two conditions: people need to know
what they need, and they need to be able to aﬀord it.
Some time after the incident with the handrails, Ar-
leen again contacted the social services. This time her
request was about a door-control system. The follow-
ing excerpt is from an e-mail she sent me:
Once again I contacted Social Services, for a door
entry system, as by the time I could safely go down-
stairs, any callers would have left, they accessed [as-
sessed] that as I had no falls on the stairs at this time
they could not help, but if my circumstances/condi-
tion changed. (I can only assume they meant break
my neck while rushing to answer the door) I paid for
my own.
Once again, Arleen took action to modify the environ-
ment around her. While it is not possible to know the
actual response of the social services, or their rationale
for their response, Arleen felt her needs were not
recognised. While before she was too unhealthy to get
the handrails, in this case she was too healthy to get
the door-control system. Something happened in that
interaction she had with the services that made her feel
she was seen as someone who could not be helped. In
a way, the speed of her progressing condition was not
in match with the services oﬀered: too quick for the
handrails, too slow for the door-control system.
Still, with her new handrails and the door-control
system, both of them paid for by herself, her living en-
vironment was still not quite appropriate for her
changing needs. The main problem was that a small
segment at the beginning of the path to her garage
was directly in front of another person’s property and
handrails could not be ﬁted there. Arleen still needed
someone to help her from her front door to the start
of the handrails so that she could get to the garage and
on to the wheelchair. Her solution to that was to move
into a bungalow, in order to be able to use the wheel-
chair without help and not to depend on someone
being there when she wants to go out. Moving into a
bungalow means having her own entrance and space
to park her car right in front of her door, with the
wheelchair being stored in an accessible location.
Dikaios: And then you also said buying a house is a
necessity to make your life easier, and that’s coming
out as an important theme as well, to make life easier.
How do you mean life is easier, or what makes life
easier for you?
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Arleen: So, I will be able to get to the car on my own,
and drive around. It won’t just be easier, it will be
nicer, it will be more pleasurable. I will have a garden
to sit in. And [now] everytime the post comes, I’ve got
to go up and down the stairs.
Although the location of the ﬂat she lived in was very
convenient, giving her easy access into town or to the
nearby park, she decided that moving into a bungalow
would lead to a nicer life. A nicer life for Arleen would
be a life in which she would be able, among other ac-
tivities, to (1) get the post without having to go up and
down stairs, and (2) get to her car or the power wheel-
chair even if she is by herself. In other words, a nicer
life is a life where the environment is modiﬁed in order
to eliminate obstacles, such as stairs and slippery path-
ways, so that she can carry out the activities she wants
to. To move a litle bit closer towards the construction
of this nicer life, Arleen had to devise, and pay for, her
own solutions. In some ways she was given the free-
dom to choose, but this freedom came together with
the responsibility to know about available solutions,
and the need to be able to pay for them.
Developing an Understanding of the
Choices Leading to a Good, or Better, Life
The two scenes above illustrate one of the many sce-
narios that can be performed when people are denied
the interventions they choose. Arleen sought to enact
subjectivity by moving between what could be chosen
and what could not be chosen. ‘It’s got to be me ﬁrst
and my illness second’, said Arleen in one of our in-
terviews. What was at stake for her was the mainte-
nance of an identity that while it included MND was
not dominated by it. She tried to enact her identity
through the modiﬁcations she chose.
Illness, Jackson (1998) argues, can be seen as a rift in
intersubjective life. In their eﬀorts to construct a good
life with an illness, people seek out interventions to at-
tend to their social world. Many of these interventions,
or practices, do not happen in a clinic or hospital but in
people’s homes (Mol et al. 2010). Having a door-entry
system would allow Arleen to answer the door to her
friends; having handrails installed would enable her to
get to her power wheelchair or to her car, and go into
town to meet friends. These modiﬁcations would lead
to the creation of a home in the world, which is a place
‘where one can experience intersubjective life and feel
recognised as a person’ (Sakellariou in press).
The enactment of the logic of choice in the context
of home modiﬁcations is often based on a neoliberal
language of cost-eﬀectiveness, where ‘desire is of no
value’ (Biehl 2007: 413), and ‘desires can be seen as li-
abilities’ (Sakellariou in press). Choices are hierar-
chised according to their value, and those deemed to
pertain to a desire, rather than a need, are down-
graded in priority. Johansson (2013) and Sakellariou
(in press) have shown how in asking for home modi-
ﬁcations, people try to frame their wishes as eligible
needs, rather than as desires, because the later are
likely to be rejected.
De Certeau (1988) argues that people implement
diﬀerent strategies and tactics in their eﬀorts to ‘make
do’, or enact everyday life. What is at stake for people
is, de Certeau (1988) argues, their autonomy and
power to engage in those practices that they deem to
be desirable, or needed. Autonomy itself can be seen
as something that people practice in their everyday
life, in order to achieve some goals they desire
(Struhkamp 2005). Strategies for de Certeau (1988: 36)
refer to:
the calculation (or manipulation) of power relation-
ships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with
will and power […] can be isolated. It postulates a
place that can be delimited as its own and serve as a
base from which relations with an exteriority […] can
be managed. 
Arleen tried to achieve this by contacting diﬀerent
services, numerous times, and explaining her situa-
tion. When this strategy was unsuccessful, she could
still draw upon other means of power – information
about what she needed, and the necessary monetary
resources. Access to power, whether in the form of so-
cial, cultural health (Dubbin et al. 2013), knowledge
or ﬁnancial capital was a central feature in Arleen’s
story and inﬂuenced her construction as a subject,
namely a bearer of knowledge/power. Arleen was os-
cillating between being a subject and being an object
and between exercising power and being the locus
where power was exercised; she was at the same time
both actor and suﬀerer (Arendt 1998). When she was
denied some choices, she mobilised other practices to
help her construct a home in the world and atend to
the impact of MND on her sociality.
Subjectivity was not a given but it was actively con-
structed through enactment of her own version of a
good life. Arleen wanted to construct a life that she
felt was worth living, a life within which she could
take decisions leading to what Ferzacca called ‘a tol-
erable present or an ideal future’ (2000: 30). The out-
come of these decisions was never certain, but having
the power to take these decisions maintained her
 position as an active agent in her life, and aﬃrmed the
importance of certain practices over others.
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Mol (2006) illustrates how an illness can be enacted
through many practices, in many diﬀerent setings. It
involves a body, and a society in dialogue between
them (Shakespeare 2006). But at the same time it all
comes together in the life of a speciﬁc person and all
the seemingly heterogeneous practices become part of
this life, in all their inconsistencies. Divides such as
those between bodily manifestations of a disease and
phenomenological meaning of an illness, or between
choice and no-choice, only become relevant and gain
meaning within the context of a particular life, within
a local context (Mol 2006).
Questions about what a good life is, or what to do
when health or function cannot be restored or main-
tained, for example, do not have a deﬁnitive answer.
The good desired by people living with an illness can-
not be deﬁned a priori, but only within the context of
their life. MND, being an incurable and progressive
disease, demands a health and social-care system that
understands the speciﬁc challenges faced by people
who live with this disease.
Several medical anthropologists discuss how peo-
ple living with chronic illness or disability and
healthcare professionals often have diﬀerent perspec-
tives regarding care and treatment options (see for ex-
ample Frank 1995; Good 1994). Research suggests this
is true in the case of MND as well (Hughes et al. 2005;
Pavey et al. 2013). This can be problematic when peo-
ple are asked to make their own choices about inter-
ventions. It is important that a common ground for
understanding is established so that health profes-
sionals and people living with an illness refer to the
same thing when they talk about right decisions re-
garding care or improving quality of life. Healthcare
can be viewed as a:
knowledge-based system. It draws on diﬀerent types
of knowledge – scientiﬁc knowledge about biological
processes, epidemiological knowledge about paterns
of disease and risk factors, and clinical knowledge
about how to treat a medical problem. (Ziebland and
Coulter 2013: 1)
As several authors have demonstrated, however (for
example Kleinman 1988; Matingly 2010), there is also
a fourth type of knowledge, which concerns how peo-
ple experience illness. This type of knowledge refers
to the knowledge developed through living with an
illness. Healthcare professionals can access this
knowledge only through geting to know how people
‘care and repair’, as Criado and Callén (2013: 1) put it.
This includes studying how people deal with prob-
lems as they arise in their daily life, and how, and
why, they choose some interventions over some oth-
ers. In other words, it is important to explore the val-
ues that guide decisions.
Understanding how people care and repair re-
quires a constant negotiation between the experiential
knowledge of the person whose body is changing and
the more standardised, generalised scientiﬁc knowl-
edge that can present facts and oﬀer possibilities that
guide choices. It is not a logic of choice that is called
for but one based on constant negotiation. In a logic
of choice diﬀerent perspectives about the desired
good remain separate; they might interact, but respon-
sibility for choosing remains ﬁrmly within speciﬁc ac-
tors. A starting point towards the construction of a
logic based on negotiation would be to let go of di-
vides such as illness and disease, actor and object,
choice and no choice, or choice and care, and instead
focus on how people work towards the construction
of the elusive good life, incorporating all these diﬀer-
ent elements.
Concluding Remarks
The story told in this article was about how one per-
son interacted with the logic of choice in her efforts
to construct her own version of a good life. I high-
lighted some of the problems of adopting a logic-of-
choice approach in the management of illness and
disability. While the logic of choice can give more
power to people to choose from a variety of available
services, sometimes people want someone to care for
them and construct these choices collaboratively.
This can be because they are too preoccupied with
the process of adapting to an everyday life compli-
cated by the effects of illness, or because they do not
feel competent enough to make these choices (Mol
2008).
And yet some other times, although people might
be both prepared and happy to choose the services
they need, their choice has to be approved by a pro-
fessional, who acts as a gate keeper. This is especially
true when these choices involve funding, and thus
need to be established as both necessary and cost-ef-
fective. When she was denied the interventions she
wanted, Arleen mobilised practices to create her ver-
sion of a nicer life, where she came ﬁrst and her illness
second.
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